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Regulation of Drugs: A Death Sentence
for the Terminally Ill?
By PRIYA BRANDES*
Tempt not a desperate man.
—William Shakespeare,
Romeo and Juliet1
Introduction
THE U.S. FOOD and drug Administration (“FDA”) has long served
as a regulator for new pharmaceuticals that are seeking introduction
into interstate commerce. It ensures that pharmaceuticals that enter
the market are safe and effective, thereby guaranteeing consumer
benefit. The U.S. government justifies this sort of regulation on the
grounds that it protects the aggregate community welfare.
The legislation that governs the FDA is largely reactive to public
outcry concerning unsafe drugs. Public health crises throughout his-
tory ultimately fostered the creation of a paternalistic organizational
structure that carefully monitors development of pharmaceutical
products. Recently, however, the FDA has fallen victim to controversy
surrounding its prevention of access to drugs that have not yet been
deemed safe or effective. For example, patient advocacy groups have
argued that FDA regulations discriminate against minority popula-
tions, such as the terminally ill, who are willing to take significant risks
for a chance to live. For terminal patients, the cost of waiting for FDA
approval2 is significant, as waiting often proves fatal.3 This tension be-
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 5, sc. 3.
2. This is a process that can take on average eight years. See Peter M. Currie, Restrict-
ing Access to Unapproved Drugs: A Compelling Government Interest?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 309
(2007).
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tween aggregate and individual interests has sparked controversy sur-
rounding the FDA’s role as protector of the collective public welfare.
A patient advocacy group known as Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs (“Abigail Alliance”)4 brought this ten-
sion to light through a lawsuit filed in 2003. In Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach (“Abigail Alliance III”),5
the organization sought to enjoin the FDA from preventing the use of
post–Phase I experimental drugs by terminally ill patients outside of
the clinical setting.6 In a 2007 decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that terminally ill patients
do not enjoy a fundamental right to obtain access to experimental
drugs.7
This Comment focuses on the moral and political philosophy
that guides current thought in bioethics and surrounds the tensions
exemplified in Abigail Alliance III. It examines the relationship be-
tween patients, physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and the gov-
ernment—concluding that the duty owed by all of these interest
groups is a responsibility to the betterment of the community. The
unifying theme of this Comment is that utilitarian philosophy best ex-
emplifies this duty. Part I begins with an overview of the FDA and
clinical trials.8 Part II analyzes the court’s reasoning in Abigail Alliance
III. Part III offers an overview of deontological and utilitarian thought
and further argues for the application of utilitarian principles. Finally,
this Comment concludes that despite the potentially tragic conse-
quences, utilitarian arguments favor limiting access to experimental
drugs—even for terminally ill patients.
3. Id. at 309–10.
4. Part of the mission of Abigail Alliance is to create greater access to developmental
drugs for patients suffering from “serious life-threatening illnesses.” The Abigail Alliance
Mission, ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://abigail-alliance.org/mission.php (last visited Nov. 22,
2011).
5. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach (Ab-
igail Alliance III), 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
6. Patricia Marisa do Coito Cruz, Case Note, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach: Is There a Right to Live?, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
347, 357 (2008).
7. Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d 695.
8. “Although there are many definitions of clinical trials, they are generally consid-
ered to be biomedical or health-related research studies in human beings that follow a
predefined protocol.” Understanding Clinical Trials, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, http://clinical
trials.gov/ct2/info/understand (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
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I. An Overview of the FDA
“New drug approvals in the United States exemplify a broader set
of governmental regulatory decisions that occur at the threshold be-
tween law and science, and involve complex and multidisciplinary
problem solving.”9
A. The History of the FDA
The FDA is a scientific, regulatory, and public health agency.10 It
regulates food products, human and animal drugs, therapeutic agents
of biological origin, medical devices, cosmetics, animal feed, and radi-
ation-emitting products for consumer, medical, and occupational
use.11 The FDA holds the distinction of being the “oldest comprehen-
sive consumer protection agency” in the federal government, dating
back to 1930.12 Yet it is still a rather recent regulatory phenomenon,
having developed over the past century alone.13 Regulatory reforms
enforced by the FDA have largely resulted from public outcry in the
wake of drug-related deaths and public health scares.14
The agency’s regulatory function arose from the enactment of
the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act (“1906 Act”), which prohibited
interstate commerce of “adulterated and misbranded” food and
drugs.15 The 1906 Act was created in response to the dire state of the
American meatpacking industry, depicted by Upton Sinclair in The
Jungle.16 This Act primarily regulated labeling, as opposed to pre-mar-
9. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug
Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 297 (2000).
10. FDA’s Origin, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm124403.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
11. Id.
12. History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/default.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2011) (noting that the FDA’s historic roots trace
back to 1848 with the appointment of Lewis Caleb Beck in the Patent Office and that it
regulated agricultural products). In 1906, the FDA was known as the Bureau of Chemistry.
See FDA’s Origin, supra note 10. In 1927, its name changed to the Food, Drug, and Insecti-
cide Administration, and this led to the shortening of the name into the modern terminol-
ogy. Id.
13. History, supra note 12.
14. Robert M. Harper, A Matter of Life and Death: Affording Terminally-Ill Patients Access
to Post-Phase I Investigational New Drugs, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 265, 267 (2008).
15. History, supra note 12. This Act was also known as the Wiley Act and was signed by
President Roosevelt during the Progressive Era. FDA History—Part I, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
16. FDA History—Part I, supra note 15.
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keting approval, of food and drugs.17 Regulation of adulterated drugs
and misbranding came into being in 1912, and the government began
to seize pharmaceutical products accordingly.18
The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“1938 Act”) passed after
an assessment that products regulated under the 1906 Act continued
to be ineffective, and in response to the elixir sulfanilamide therapeu-
tic disaster.19 Elixir sulfanilamide was prescribed to treat streptococcal
infections; however, the solvent used in this untested product “was a
highly toxic chemical analogue of antifreeze.”20 Consumption of this
substance caused over one hundred deaths, including those of women
and children. The widespread public fury that resulted directly con-
tributed to the passage of the 1938 Act.21
The 1938 Act represented the dawn of modern regulation. It pro-
vided a novel mechanism for overseeing the development of medical
devices.22 It also mandated that drugs be adequately labeled, includ-
ing satisfactory directions for safe use, and prescribed pre-market ap-
proval for all new drugs.23 The burden now rested with the
manufacturers to prove the safety and efficacy of any drug to the FDA
before it could be sold on the market.24
The Kefauver-Harris Amendment was passed in 1962 in response
to the crisis surrounding thalidomide.25 Thalidomide was prescribed
as a sedative for pregnant women, but it ultimately caused serious
physical abnormalities in newborn babies.26 The resulting amend-
ments mandated that a drug be safe and effective before marketing
could take place; therefore, stricter controls were imposed for drug
17. Id. The Act focused on the regulation of foods and was less concerned with
“adulterated or misbranded drugs.” Id.
18. Id.
19. FDA History—Part II, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Harper, supra note 14, at 269 (“[T]he Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 did not impose any obligation on the manufacturer to obtain FDA approval before
releasing its drug into the marketplace. Rather, absent an FDA determination that the
drug was not safe, the drug was automatically approved for commercial distribution.” (foot-
note omitted)). Subsequently in 1951, the Durham-Humphrey Amendment of 1951 was
passed; it clarified what constituted a prescription or over-the-counter drug. FDA History—
Part III, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/
Origin/ucm055118.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
25. FDA History—Part III, supra note 24.
26. Id. This drug was never approved in the United States. Id.
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trials.27 This was a significant departure from the predecessor acts and
amendments, as FDA approval was not previously required.28
Favor for deregulation only developed after the AIDS health crisis
in the 1980s.29 Initially, AIDS seemed to appear disproportionately in
homosexuals and intravenous drug users, both unpopular political mi-
norities. As such, societal attention to the disease and support for find-
ing a cure were minimal.30 Since the FDA had not officially
recognized the disease at that time, desperately ill victims facing immi-
nent death lacked an FDA approved treatment option—which trans-
lated to no hope for a cure.31 A movement arose around what many
viewed as an inadequate response by the government to this pressing
public health crisis.32 Soon thereafter, access to experimental therapy
became a concern, and societal pressure on the FDA to provide and
promote access to new drugs increased dramatically—resulting in the
reform of the drug approval process.33 Most notably, the FDA under-
took measures to increase access to drugs that were not yet approved
and to expedite approval for patients suffering from incurable
illnesses.34
Between 1987 and 1993, the FDA created exemptions to the In-
vestigational New Drug Application (“IND”) process by permitting the
use of investigational drugs as treatment for patients who were seri-
ously ill.35 The programs that were promulgated included “Subpart E”
and the “accelerated approval” program, which expedited FDA review
for qualifying new drugs.36 Other regulations that accelerated access
27. Id. Informed consent was one of the provisions implemented by this new amend-
ment. Id.
28. Harper, supra note 14, at 269–70.
29. Benjamin R. Rossen, FDA’s Proposed Regulations to Expand Access to Investigational
Drugs for Treatment Use: The Status Quo in the Guise of Reform, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 189
(2009) (noting that AIDS was officially identified by the Centers for Disease Control in
1982).
30. Id. (“[D]espite the looming presence of a serious public health crisis, AIDS had
not become a major political issue. Government research expenditures remained relatively
small and FDA had not approved a single treatment for the disease.”).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 190 (noting that People with AIDS Health Group and the AIDS Coalition to
Unleash Power aided the passage of a grassroots movement that pressed therapy access
issues).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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included the “parallel track” program, which was designed for early
access specifically for AIDS patients.37
The deregulation trend developed over the past twenty years as a
result of political pressure, consumer activism, and industry.38 In re-
sponse to these combined forces, Congress enacted the FDA Moderni-
zation Act (“FDAMA”) in 1997. This Act sought to reduce the delay
that accompanies the FDA approval process39 in order to grant pa-
tients access to investigational drugs for “the diagnosis, monitoring, or
treatment of a serious disease or condition in emergency situations.”40
The FDAMA founded the fast track program.41 However, the FDA si-
multaneously maintained that a drug must first seek approval to be
commercialized.42
B. Regulation and Structure of Clinical Trials
If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called re-
search, would it?43
—Albert Einstein
The FDA is responsible for assuring that pharmaceutical drugs
and medical devices are both safe and effective.44 Accordingly, a phar-
maceutical company seeking to market a new drug in the United
States must first obtain FDA approval.45 For the purposes of this Com-
ment, the focus is on the clinical phases regulated by the FDA.46 In
37. Id. Further discussion of the “parallel track” program can be found in AIDS, Exper-
imental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process by Michael D. Greenberg. See
Greenberg, supra note 9.
38. FDA History—Part V, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm125632.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
39. See discussion infra Part B.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(a) (2006) (effective January 15, 2007).
41. Harper, supra note 14, at 270.
42. Rossen, supra note 29, at 193.
43. Barbara A. Noah, Bioethical Malpractice: Risk and Responsibility in Human Research, 7
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 175, 175 (2004) (quoting Albert Einstein).
44. What Does FDA Do?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
Transparency/Basics/ucm194877.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (“[The FDA is responsible
for p]rotecting the public health by assuring that foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary and
properly labeled; human and veterinary drugs, and vaccines and other biological products
and medical devices intended for human use are safe and effective . . . . Advancing the
public health by helping to speed product innovations[.] Helping the public get the accu-
rate science-based information they need to use medicines, devices, and foods to improve
their health.”).
45. What Is the Approval Process for a New Prescription Drug?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194949.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2011).
46. A brief description of the preclinical stages: At the outset, the role of the FDA in
drug research is limited. The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
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large part, FDA oversight requires a sponsor, generally a pharmaceuti-
cal company, to submit an IND.47 If the IND is approved, three dis-
tinct phases (also referred to as stages) of human testing commence.48
A Phase I study involves the primary introduction of the new drug
into human subjects.49 At this stage the size of studies range from
twenty to eighty subjects.50 Phase I studies are “designed to determine
the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans,
the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if possible, to
gain early evidence on effectiveness.”51 Thus, the primary aim of these
studies is to determine preliminary safety of the drug for continued
use in the clinical setting.52
A Phase II study is designed to “evaluate[ ] the effectiveness of
the drug for a particular indication or indications in patients with the
disease or condition under study and to determine the common
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143475.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2011). The developer must the first ask the question: “If the body’s function-
ing is changed, will I have a useful drug?” Id. Preliminary research focuses on how the body
functions, both normally and abnormally, or at its most basic levels. Id. This forms the
concept about how a drug could be developed to prevent, cure, or treat a disease. Id.
Once the researcher has formed a concept of how a drug can be used, he has a target
to aim for when conducting laboratory experimentation. Id. (noting that researchers add
compounds to enzymes, cell cultures, or cellular substances that are cultivated in test tubes
to measure chemical effect). This process can require testing dozens of compounds. Id.
Similar results can follow computer simulations of enzymes and chemical structures or
testing on microscopic organisms. Id.
Next, the compounds that have shown some desired effects are tested in living ani-
mals. Id. The preclinical trials aim to assess the toxic effects and the safety levels of the
drug at different doses. Id. Where previous research has aimed to determine what “a drug
does to the body,” animal testing aims to resolve “what the body does to the drug.” Id.
(stating that scientists will measure the amounts of the drug absorbed in the blood; deter-
mine how the drug is metabolized; the toxicity and break down of metabolites; and the
speed at which the drug and metabolites are excreted). However, when the drug is poorly
absorbed, unsafe, or does not have the desired effect, it is often abandoned. Id. The Phar-
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America estimates that 5 in 5000 compounds
make the voyage from preclinical to human testing. Id.
47. Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that an IND must
contain “detailed information establishing that human testing is appropriate”); see also 21
C.F.R. § 312.23 (2011).
48. This does not include the preclinical process described supra note 46. In some
instances there may be a fourth phase of clinical testing. Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d at 698.
49. Investigational New Drug Application (IND), 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1) (2011).
50. Id.
51. Id. Phase I studies also assess “drug metabolism, structure-activity relationships,
and mechanism of action in humans, as well as studies in which investigational drugs are
used as research tools to explore biological phenomena or disease processes.” Id.
§ 312.21(a)(2).
52. Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d at 698.
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short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug.”53 These
studies are “well controlled, closely monitored, and conducted in a
relatively small number of patients, usually involving no more than
several hundred subjects.”54
A Phase III study is characterized by a large participant pool of
“several hundred to several thousand subjects.”55 At this stage, studies
are designed to “gather the additional information about effectiveness
and safety that is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relation-
ship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician
labeling.”56
Over the years, the FDA has reacted to public health crises by
implementing reforms that serve to chip away at the testing regula-
tions and requirements at each of these phases. “The FDA, acting in
concert with Congress, has developed a variety of mechanisms for
making investigational drugs available for treatment uses during the
course of ongoing clinical trials.”57 Regardless of the exceptions and
exemptions created to circumvent the FDA process, the requirements
of approval apply to all new drugs, including those used for treatment
of terminal illnesses.58 “These mechanisms are designed to strike a
balance among the competing interests and concerns that are
presented when patients and physicians wish to treat serious diseases
with investigational drugs.”59
II. Abigail Alliance
This is not just about me. I am trying to help so many others.60
—Abigail Burroughs
Abigail Burroughs is the young face behind the movement to-
wards compassionate access. Abigail was nineteen years old when she
was diagnosed with head and neck cancer.61 She suffered through va-
rious types of chemotherapy and radiation treatments “to no avail.”62
53. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 312.21(c).
56. Id.
57. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 4, Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 07-444) [hereinafter “Brief for the Respondents in Opposition”].
58. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551–59 (1979).
59. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 5.
60. Frank Burroughs, Our Story, ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://www.abigail-alliance.org/
story.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
61. Complaint at 19, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
McClellan, No. 03-1601 (RMU) (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004), 2004 WL 3777340 at *19.
62. Id.
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At the end of her life, she was treated at Johns Hopkins by a renowned
oncologist who attempted to use EGFR-targeted drug C225 (Erbitux)
from Imclone Systems, or (Iressa) from AstraZeneca to save her life.63
Abigail’s father, Frank Burroughs, founded Abigail Alliance64 in
March 2001.65 Abigail Alliance—with its namesake’s help—lobbied
the pharmaceutical companies, Congress, and the media to obtain a
chance at treatment.66 Unfortunately, Abigail did not qualify for par-
ticipation in Iressa clinical trials because the nature of these trials was
limited both by size and type of patients.67 Similarly, Abigail could not
obtain Erbitux—a drug intended for the treatment of colon cancer.68
Abigail lost her fight against cancer at the age of twenty-one.69
In 2003, Abigail Alliance submitted a proposal to the FDA to cre-
ate new regulations that would enable terminally ill patients with no
other treatment options to receive experimental drugs post–Phase I
testing.70 The complaint challenged an FDA policy that “prohibits
mentally competent patients with no other treatment options from
purchasing investigational drugs—medicines showing initial evidence
of safety and efficacy in clinical trials, but not yet approved—even
though their physicians recommend these drugs as their best hope of
surviving or of prolonging their lives.”71
The Court of Appeals on this matter found that through the
“‘treatment IND’” program, the FDA may approve the use of an inves-
tigational drug for terminally ill patients as long as: (1) there exists
“‘no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy,’”
(2) the drug is currently “ ‘under investigation in a controlled clinical
trial,’” (3) and “the drug’s sponsor ‘is actively pursuing marketing ap-
63. Burroughs, supra note 60.
64. The mission of Abigail Alliance is to help “create wider access to developmental
cancer drugs and other drugs for serious life-threatening illnesses.” The Abigail Alliance Mis-
sion, supra note 4.
65. Complaint, supra note 61, at 19.
66. Id.; see also The Abigail Alliance Mission, supra note 4.
67. Complaint, supra note 61, at 19.
68. Id.
69. Id. Other individuals named in the complaint include: David Baxter, a young man
who died of colorectal cancer shortly after he turned seventeen (Baxter was unable to
participate in clinical trials because they are restricted to individuals over the age of eigh-
teen); Alita Randazzo, a thirty-five year old woman who died of colorectal cancer; and Joel
Oppenheim, who was diagnosed with multiple myeloma (Oppenheim’s prior treatment
history—specifically, with the drug dexamethadrone—disqualified him from participation
in the clinical trials). Id. at 20–25.
70. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan (Abigail
Alliance I), No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340, at *1 (D.D.C Aug. 30, 2004).
71. Complaint, supra note 61, at 1–2.
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proval of the investigational drug with due diligence.’”72 However,
under the existing law, the FDA maintains the ability to refuse any
treatment request if: (1) the FDA believes that there exists “no ‘rea-
sonable basis’ to conclude the drug is effective,” or (2) approving the
request would “‘expose the patient[ ] . . . to an unreasonable and
significant additional risk of illness or injury.’”73
Accordingly, the crux of the issue is that the authority to approve
or deny last-ditch efforts to save a life rests with the FDA alone. In
practice, the FDA does not approve the use of drugs outside the
clinical trials until the drug had passed Phase III, or, at the earliest,
Phase II testing.74
Abigail Alliance petitioned the FDA to adopt the Tier 1 Initial
Approval proposal that would permit drug sponsors to make investiga-
tional drugs available to terminally ill patients with no other treatment
options, once the drug was post–Phase I testing.75 Abigail Alliance
claims in Count I that:
FDA’s policy prohibiting the sale of investigational drugs to willing
and mentally competent patients with no other treatment options
interferes with the ability of Abigail Alliance’s patient-members
and other terminally ill patients to choose the appropriate treat-
ment for terminal illness, in violation of rights secured to those
individuals by the rights to privacy and the liberty of the U.S.
Constitution.76
Abigail Alliance argues that the FDA’s “compassionate use” programs
only aid the demands of “a fraction of those in desperate need.”77
72. Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
73. Id.
74. See generally Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57.
75. Complaint, supra note 61, at 27.
76. Id. at 30. Count II of the complaint states:
FDA’s policy prohibiting the sale of investigational drugs to willingly and mentally
competent patients with no other treatment options operates as a death sentence
for those patients, including the Abigail Alliance’s patient-members, in violation
of the guarantee in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution against depri-
vation of life without due process.
Id. at 32.
77. Id. at 15. The FDA responded by stating that senior officials had reviewed the
submissions but stated that the inquiry by Abigail Alliance “‘raised several important ques-
tions about expanded access that [they] believe[d] deserve[d] further consideration,’ but
questioned whether the specific proposal put forward by the Alliance ‘would have the in-
tended desirable effects for patients.’” Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d at 700 (quoting Letter
from Peter J. Pitts, Assoc. Comm’r for External Relations, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., to Frank Burroughs, President, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs (Apr. 25, 2003)).
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A. Constitutional Rights
The decision of Abigail Alliance III hinged on the absence of a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Abigail Alliance argued that the FDA prohibition on the
prescription of investigational drugs violates patients’ “privacy and lib-
erty rights, as well as their rights to life, pursuant to the due process
clause of the 5th Amendment.”78 Specifically, it asserted that the court
should find a fundamental right of access “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”79 Abigail Alliance further stressed that pharmaceuti-
cal companies have a derivative right to sell their products at fair mar-
ket value to incentivize enforcement of that right.80
The court framed the right at issue in the following way:
Whether the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause embraces
the right of a terminally ill patient with no remaining approved
treatment options to decide, in consultation with his or her own
doctor, whether to seek access to investigational medications that
the [FDA] concedes are safe and promoting enough for substantial
human testing.81
The court then turned to the question of whether there in fact existed
a fundamental right82 as framed above. Judicial recognition of a fun-
damental right begins with an analysis of whether or not the right is
“‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ [including the
Nation’s practices], and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacri-
ficed.”83 The court has also recognized a fundamental right where it
pertains to “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.”84
Here the court paid particular attention to two arguments set
forth by Abigail Alliance:
78. Abigail Alliance I, No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340, at *9 (D.D.C Aug. 30,
2004).
79. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
80. See generally Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57.
81. Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d at 701.
82. The Court has stated that “[t]he Clause . . . provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). However, the Court is reluctant to
expand the interpretation of fundamental rights. Such rights have been limited to “the
rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children,
to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.” Id. at 720
(citations omitted).
83. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (citations omitted).
84. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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(1) that “common law and historical American practices have tradi-
tionally trusted individual doctors and their patients with almost
complete autonomy to evaluate the efficacy of medical treatments”;
and (2) that FDA policy is “inconsistent with the way that our legal
tradition treats persons in all other life-threatening situations.”85
Significantly, the court did not address the broader question of
“whether access to medicine might ever implicate fundamental
rights.” 86 Because the claimed right (as strategically narrowed) was
not deemed to be fundamental, rational basis review was applied to
Abigail’s right of access claim.87
Lastly, Abigail Alliance ineffectively argued that the right of ac-
cess is protected in concepts of self-defense, necessity, and interfer-
ence with rescue, encompassed in the protection afforded to “persons
in peril.”88
B. Abigail Alliance Does Not Succeed on Constitutional Grounds
The court’s inquiry was appropriately founded upon the notion
that the government, specifically the FDA, has historically possessed
the power to regulate drugs. While Abigail Alliance argued that the
regulation of drug efficacy began in 1962, the court found that since
the conception of the FDA congressional regulations were passed in
response to safety concerns.89 The court’s line of reasoning is appro-
priate where public outcry surrounding health crises has historically
pressured the government to reform the regulations, regarding food
and drugs, as preventative measures for the future.
The United States has continuously expressed an interest in the
regulation of drugs. The Nation continually tailors its legislation in
85. Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d at 703.
86. Id. at 701 n.5 (“The dissent has recast the Alliance’s proposed right away from the
terms used in its briefs and oral argument—a right to access investigational new drugs—
into a right to ‘try to save one’s life,’ which has ‘its textual anchor in the right to life
[expressed in the Fifth Amendment].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Abigail Alliance III,
495 F.3d at 714–15 (Rogers, J., dissenting))).
87. Id. at 712. Therefore, it was Abigail Alliance’s burden to demonstrate that there
was no rational relation between the regulations and the governmental interest. Id. The
court found that Alliance could not meet this burden. Id. This Comment primarily focuses
on the analysis for a fundamental right as it speaks to the issue at large regarding whether
individuals should have a right of access.
88. Id. at 703. The rights of self-defense and necessity, in addition to the tort of inter-
ference with rescue, are beyond the scope of this Comment. These rights are more abstract
than direct comparison to health law cases that are on point.
89. Id. (“Thus, to succeed on its claim of a fundamental right of access for the termi-
nally ill to experimental drugs, the Alliance must show not only that there is a tradition of
access to drugs that have not yet been proven effective, but also a tradition of access to
drugs that have not yet been proven safe.”).
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light of modern concerns about “risks associated with drug safety and
efficacy.”90 As an example, the Abigail Alliance III court cited to an act
dating back to 1736, which stated that the Colony of Virginia “ad-
dressed the dispensing of more drugs than was ‘necessary or useful’
because that practice had become ‘dangerous and intolerable.’”91
Similarly, in the early 1800s, the Territory of Orleans passed an act
that required a pharmacist to have obtained a diploma and have
passed an examination before dispensing drugs; legislation passed in
South Carolina required pharmacists to obtain licenses.92 Alabama,
Georgia, and Louisiana witnessed various prohibitions on the sale of
deteriorated drugs and poisons.93 Therefore, the court correctly con-
cluded that even at the founding of this Nation “governments re-
spond[ed] to the risks of new compounds as they became aware of
and able to address those risks.”94 While these trends are not attributa-
ble to the birth of the FDA, they demonstrate the reason why Abigail
Alliance’s argument that regulation began in 1962 fell short of judicial
recognition.
The court further explained that the absence of federal regula-
tion surrounding drug development prior to the 1900s is attributable
to the nonexistent need for regulation at that time.95 In 1902, Con-
gress began to respond to public health scares, largely in response to
the use of a vaccine that proved deadly for the children of Missouri
and New Jersey.96 The Pure Food and Drugs Act followed.97 Part of
the court’s rationale in finding a history of drug regulation parallels
and cites to the history of the FDA discussed supra Part I.98
Even where Abigail Alliance urges the court to examine the re-
cent history of the FDA, it is instructive to note that despite the public
pressure that led to other early access programs, the FDA has never
abolished the requirement of clinical trials. This demonstrates the im-
portance of these regulations on the development of pharmaceuticals.
It is not surprising that the court declined to find a fundamental right
90. Id.
91. Id. at 704.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (explaining that the need for federal rulemaking developed after the Civil War
with the expansion of interstate commerce).
96. Id. at 705.
97. Id.
98. Id. Interestingly, the court notes an objection to the 1938 Act, which parallels
objections made by Abigail Alliance—the history of the Act demonstrates concerns about
the absence of the right to self-medication. Id.
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in light of the Nation’s traditions, whereby the FDA reacts to health
crises by creating regulations to better manage and protect against
future harm. It would be a stretch to conclude that none of these
regulations and government responses promoted the safety of the citi-
zens and preserved the efficacy of drugs. Thus, the FDA rightly argued
that regulation of the sale of adulterated and unsafe drugs is merely “a
difference in degree, not a difference in kind.”99
After determining that the proffered right was not fundamental,
the court subjected Abigail Alliance’s claimed right of access to exper-
imental drugs to mere rational basis scrutiny.100 The governmental
interest was appropriately set forth by the FDA: “Without a require-
ment of FDA approval, patients could be exposed to unreasonable
risks from investigational drugs that may be neither safe nor effec-
tive.”101 Conversely, Abigail Alliance recognized this inherent risk as
articulated, but stressed that patients should be permitted to assume
the risk and make deeply personal life decisions for themselves.102
The court looked to Supreme Court precedent to conclude that FDA
approval requirements are rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est.103 Therefore, for the purposes of its analysis, the court rejected
the distinction between an audience of terminally ill individuals and a
greater population: “[F]or the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug
is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not
offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.”104 In conclusion,
where the court did not find a fundamental right of access to experi-
mental drugs, it rightly concluded that there was a rational basis be-
tween the state interest in regulation and the corresponding
legislation. This interest transcended the classification of whether or
not an individual suffers from a terminal illness.
The court’s holding leaves this issue to be decided by the demo-
cratic process, thus encouraging the continuation of public debate
and legal reform: “Consistent with that precedent, our holding today
ensures that this debate among the Alliance, the FDA, the scientific
and medical communities, and the public may continue through the
99. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 13.
100. Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d at 712.
101. Id. (quoting Corrected En Banc Brief for the Appellees at 55–56, Abigail Alliance
III, 495 F.3d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 04-5350)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing United States v. Rutherford, 422 U.S. 544 (1979)).
104. Id. at 713 (quoting Rutherford, 422 U.S at 555–56) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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democratic process.”105 As the public remains susceptible to a possible
change in the FDA regulations, the following analysis will focus on
whether or not, as a matter of public policy and philosophy, the termi-
nally ill should be able to receive access to post–Phase I experimental
medication.106
III. Philosophical, Ethical, and Moral Arguments
The impulses of nature, then contain hindrances to the fulfillment
of duty in the mind of man, and resisting forces, some of them
powerful; and he must judge himself able to combat these and to
conquer them by means of reason, not in the future, but in the
present, simultaneously with the thought; he must judge that he
can do what the law unconditionally commands that he ought.
—Immanuel Kant107
There are two dominant philosophies in bioethics: utilitarianism
and deontology (also known as Kantianism). These moral principles
act as behavioral guidelines that dictate a standard for societal con-
duct. It is important to examine the conflicting ethical and philosoph-
ical tensions raised by early access to unapproved drugs to fully
understand the perspectives of the researchers, patients, doctors, and
the government. Arguments surrounding expanded access embody
the notion of duties—specifically where the duty to provide access to
investigational drugs, if found, should fall. As characterized by Kant,
“[t]he notion of duty then must be an ethical one.”108 Ethical deci-
sions can be characterized based on the intentions of the parties and
the consequences of their actions.
105. Id. at 713–14.
106. The law surrounding post–Phase I compassionate use could see a future of
change, as the FDA is a largely reactionary mechanism that responds to public health crisis.
First, this specific issue has never been heard by the Supreme Court. Next—as discussed
infra—Abigail Alliance could potentially present its arguments before Congress in an at-
tempt to “convince our Nation’s lawmakers that the current balance between safety and
risk is scientifically or morally misguided and that terminally ill patients should have the
early access to experimental drugs that the Alliance seeks.” Abigail Alliance for Better Ac-
cess to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach (Abigail Alliance II), 445 F.3d 470, 487
(Griffith, J., dissenting). In doing so, the democratic process would assess testimony by
scientists, doctors, patients, advocacy groups, moralists, ethicists, and citizens on the mat-
ter, without circumventing the current power of the FDA. See id. at 470 (majority opinion).
Since a large part of this analysis contains a complex moral question, I will present two
approaches—a utilitarian and a deontological analysis—to better understand the tensions
exacerbated by terminal illness.
107. IMMANUEL KANT, KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON
THE THEORY OF ETHICS 290 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., 6th ed. 1927).
108. Id.
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For purposes of this Comment, the key distinction between the
utilitarian and deontological approaches is one of the absolute good, as
opposed to the relative good.109 Dissenters of the utilitarian school of
thought characterize the good as valuing personal freedoms, such as
the access to investigational drugs to preserve life “higher than other
goods or as having embraced a different view of the good life with a
different schedule of the relative significance of costs and benefits.”110
This Comment concludes that when there is a moral decision to be
made regarding access to investigational drugs, the communal good
should supersede the individual desire of access. Therefore, societal
interests and altruism should ultimately trump narrowly defined self-
interests.
A. The Utilitarian Analysis
Ethics conforming to the utilitarian principal operate to maxi-
mize the net-well-being and to provide “the greatest good for the
greatest number.”111 One of the central missions of the FDA is to pro-
spectively review and approve new drugs in the interest of public
health.112 The FDA regulations exist to ensure product safety and effi-
cacy; in doing so, it is imperative that the FDA conducts a risk-benefit
analysis to determine whether a drug is too harmful to reach the mar-
ket.113 Regulations for clinical trials ensure the maximum consumer
benefit from access to safe and effective approved products. When the
process involves such an apparent utility to the community at large,
proper regulation is necessary and should be followed—even where
the failure to obtain access could harm an individual. In determining
the difference between what we ought to do and what we should do,
we must examine the chain of causes and effects (not only focusing on
what is right or wrong).114 The following section applies a utilitarian
moral approach to support restricted access of investigational drugs
for terminally ill patients.
Utility is defined as:
109. See id.
110. H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 83 (1986).
111. David T. McDowell, Note, Death of an Idea: The Anencephalic as an Organ Donor, 72
TEX. L. REV. 893, 925 (1994).
112. Currie, supra note 2, at 309.
113. Id.
114. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION 12–13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789) (“[An action con-
forms to the principles of utility] when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the
community is greater than any it has to diminish it.”).
Spring 2012] REGULATION OF DRUGS 1165
[P]roperty in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, ad-
vantage, pleasure, good, or happiness . . . to prevent the happening
of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is
considered: if that party be the community in general, then the
happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the
happiness of that individual.115
Then, the interest of the community is “the sum of the interests of the
several members who compose it.”116 When an action occurs in confir-
mation with the utility of the community, it has a tendency to “aug-
ment the happiness of the community” that is greater than “any
[tendency] it has to diminish it.”117 When one’s actions conform to
the principle of utility, it is said that those actions ought to be done or
should be done.118 In this context, there is no evaluation of what is
right or wrong in accordance with an individual moral compass.
This utilitarian balancing occurred at the moment the Nation’s
laws and policies surrounding scientific development were first con-
ceived. Science adheres to and mutually affects these laws and poli-
cies.119 Robertson explains:
Because science is both a source of power and a threat to existing
power structures, governments have a stake in seeing that science
develops or that it doesn’t, and in extracting profits and power as it
does. Science is too important to be left to scientists alone, but
because of their expertise can never be totally severed from
them.120
This notion demonstrates that government regulation is necessary to
maintain a fully functional scientific community that produces widely
available new technologies.
Governmental regulations, like ethical considerations, should dif-
fer depending on the stage of scientific development. Different stages
pose different potential harms; for example, science at its early stages
focuses on legal and policy issues surrounding research and develop-
ment.121 At early stage development, existing regulatory structures en-
sure the safety and validity of the technology to enable it to reach the
market—the description of the FDA clinical trial phases discussed
115. Id. at 12 (“The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons
who are considered as constituting as it were its members.”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 12–13.
118. Id. at 13.
119. See John A. Robertson, Law, Science and Innovation: Introduction to the Symposium, 38
J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 175, 176 (2010). This article provides an insightful analysis of ethical
issues surrounding the development of embryonic stem cells. Embryonic stem cell access
poses similar issues regarding compassionate access as does new drug development.
120. Id.
121. Robertson, supra note 119, at 176.
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supra embody these regulations.122 Conversely, later stage regulation
ensures wide communal access to new, safe, and effective
treatments.123
Even where early research raises significant questions of morality
or public policy, continued regulation by the government is necessary.
The scientific community has similarly stalled research because of the
potential harmful effect on society.124 Therefore, even where the FDA
limits access to investigational drugs, review and consideration by the
pharmaceutical company is necessary to prevent detrimental harm
and further public health crises.
1. The Pharmaceutical Companies
At first blush, it would seem that pharmaceutical companies
would favor Abigail Alliance’s proposition—drugs made available
through early access could be sold at market value with minimal test-
ing. However, any potential for profit would pale in comparison to the
risks that a pharmaceutical company would assume. For example,
should terminal patients—a particularly vulnerable population—be
exposed to drugs released absent the tight controls of a clinical trial,
“unexplainable, adverse reactions to the drug could be revealed.”125
The risks accompanying such side effects would also be greater due to
decreased scientific controls126 and an increased, unregulated sample
size. These factors could result in premature termination of the
study.127
Were early access made available, the pharmaceutical companies
would also risk exposure to significant legal liability should serious
and unforeseen side effects arise. In this context, the level of safety is
wildly uncertain and the population of individuals receiving investiga-
tional drugs is greatly expanded—thus increasing the likelihood of
litigation. Manufacturers could face legal liability in areas such as
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. For example, the development and emergence of recombinant DNA techniques
(that involved the ability of gene splicing in common organisms) created fear that engi-
neered organisms that escaped the laboratory could cause potential epidemics and other
disasters. This led the scientists, not the government, to halt development until protective
mechanisms had been established. Id. at 176–77.
125. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Right to Experimental Treatment: FDA New Drug Ap-
proval, Constitutional Rights, and the Public’s Health, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 272 (2009).
126. For example, a patient’s prior drug therapy, which would have prevented their
participation in a clinical trial, could negatively interact with the current, experimental
drug therapy.
127. Leonard, supra note 125, at 272.
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product liability, failure to warn, fraud, and negligence.128 In addi-
tion, small start-up companies may find it difficult to provide an ade-
quate supply of investigational drugs to a larger patient population if
such a fundamental right was found.129 The totality of these risks
would create a chilling effect on the production and development of
new treatment options. Accordingly, society could face a decrease in
innovation that might ultimately lead to many more deaths.
2. The Physicians
The interest of physicians must be considered because, in a situa-
tion where early access was an available treatment option, drugs would
be obtained through the permission of the FDA, compliance with the
pharmaceutical company, and with the prescription of a physician.130
If one focuses on the utilitarian aspect of physician care, granting a
fundamental right to investigational drugs could subject physicians to
an increased risk of litigation resulting from the prescription of medi-
cation. In essence, the physician is the entity that evaluates the risks
associated with various drugs—which are largely unknown—and the
corresponding benefits of the same—which are also largely un-
known.131 Physicians placed in this position are at a significant disad-
vantage in comparison to the researchers. They do not have access to
the technology needed to monitor the patients, and identification of
the onset of side effects could prove more difficult: “[R]esearch sub-
jects have greater protections than do patients in such cases because
research is independently reviewed and there are limits on the risks to
which subjects may be exposed.”132 This could lead to a scenario in
which a product appears to be favorable to both the physician and the
patient, but is wholly ineffective—thus subjecting the patient to false
expectations and exposing the physician to the fear of litigation. As
Iltis appropriately comments: “Physicians face substantial risk of liabil-
ity for deviating from the standard of care unless they can demon-
strate that it was reasonable to believe it was in the patient’s best
interest to do so.”133 In comparison, clinical researchers are not
bound by the same constraints, as they do not act in the subjects’ best
128. Id. at 273.
129. Id. at 272.
130. Leonard, supra note 125, at 273.
131. See Meghan K. Talbott, The Implications of Expanding Access to Unapproved Drugs, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316, 317 (2007).
132. Ana S. Iltis, What the Doctor Didn’t Say: The Hidden Truth About Medical Research By
Jerry Menikoff and Edward P. Richards, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 419, 420 (2008) (book review).
133. Id.
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interest. This distinction, while harsh, appropriately allocates the risk
of litigation for investigational drugs.
3. The Government
The government’s arguments in Abigail Alliance III—favoring the
prohibition of access to post–Phase I investigational drugs—fall
squarely within utilitarian philosophy. First, the FDA argues that there
is concern about unregulated products entering the marketplace. If
expanded access transcends the clinical trial setting, then further re-
search and testing would occur after the widespread consumption of
investigational drugs.134
Second, after a drug enters the marketplace, it is difficult to en-
roll participants in studies and carry them out effectively.135 As Leo-
nard reasons: “Why would a patient who desperately wants a drug
enroll in a traditional, ‘gold standard’ clinical trial and risk being as-
signed to a placebo or control group rather than buy the drug up-
front?”136 Failure to enroll can result in eliminating an available pool
of potential subjects based on socioeconomics or other differences,
which in turn could undermine researchers’ ability to achieve accu-
rate results.137 Concerns regarding the diminished importance of
clinical trial results would be compounded if the drug manufacturer
could receive a profit—it would provide a strong incentive for phar-
maceutical companies to circumvent the FDA regulations.138 The FDA
aptly notes that in such a scenario, “the sponsor’s financial incentive
to complete the scientifically rigorous and expensive clinical trial pro-
cess [would be] directly reduced, and the sponsor may find it more
attractive to sell the unapproved drug today than to vigorously pursue
years of research for regulatory approval that most investigational
drugs never obtain.”139
Therefore, expanded access has the potential to undermine the
clinical trial process140 and the quality of collected data, an essential
134. Abigail Alliance I, No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2004).
135. Id.
136. Leonard, supra note 125, at 274.
137. Id. at 275.
138. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 6; see also Leonard,
supra note 125, at 274 (“Manufacturers could sell drugs without the expense, effort, and
risk of failure associated with conducting full trials.”).
139. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 6.
140. For example, diethylstiberstrol was prescribed to women to avoid risks of miscar-
riage and as a prenatal vitamin, but was never systematically tested through controlled
clinical trials. This drug ultimately led to cancer in the treated women’s daughters. Leo-
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component of determining a given drug’s safety and efficacy.141 Suc-
cessful completion of Phase I determines that the drug is safe enough
to be administered to a moderately larger, closely monitored popula-
tion of Phase II testing—not that it is safe or effective for society at
large.142 The result of early release would be that the product would
enjoy some longevity in the market place with little understanding of
actual benefits or potential toxicity.143
Second, due to the serious nature of treatments for various termi-
nal illnesses, possible adverse health consequences resulting from in-
vestigational drugs include hastened mortality.144 One should
carefully examine the argument for premature use in light of the spe-
cific qualities of drugs used to treat cancer: namely that this category
of drugs are inherently toxic by design, and “their toxic effects often
do not discriminate well between cancerous and non-cancerous
cells.”145
The Supreme Court illuminated this concern in United States v.
Rutherford, where it declared that the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of
1962 demonstrated congressional intent to protect individuals suffer-
ing from fatal illnesses.146 In Rutherford, the plaintiffs similarly argued
that regulations did not have any reasonable application to terminally
ill patients.147 The Court expressly disagreed, stressing that “the con-
cept of safety . . . is not without meaning for terminal patients. For the
terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for
nard, supra note 125, at 274. Similarly, autologous bone marrow transplant with high dose
chemotherapy was a promising treatment option for breast and ovarian cancer. Accord-
ingly, there was significant public pressure to make this treatment available even in the
absence of complete scientific information. However, complete clinical trials demonstrated
that it was no more effective than approved treatments. Id. Lastly, in the 1980s clinical
researchers were unable to enroll volunteers for the clinical trial of azidothymidine be-
cause of the concerns about receiving a placebo and the availability of drugs through the
grey market. Id. at 275.
141. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 5; see also Expanded
Access to Experimental Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,147, 75,150 (proposed
Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) (“[A] system of blindly permitting
uncontrolled access to investigational drugs could make it difficult or impossible to enroll
adequate numbers of patients in clinical trials.”).
142. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 3.
143. Abigail Alliance I, No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2004).
144. Id.
145. Id. at *4.
146. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 (1979) (“Both [Committee] Re-
ports note with approval the FDA’s policy of considering effectiveness when passing on the
safety of drugs prescribed for ‘life-threatening disease.’”).
147. Id. at 555.
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inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of ther-
apeutic benefit.”148 Therefore, there is no reason to question the
FDA’s ability to regulate drugs for the terminally ill as opposed to any
other patient population.
Lastly, the government’s authority to regulate access to these
drugs would be significantly diminished by the recognition of the re-
quested fundamental right.149 Identifying a right of access to life-sav-
ing drugs outside FDA approval could lead to an acceptance of the
same right for patients who are not terminally ill but need treatment
for other illnesses.150 This possibility leads one to ask: At what point is
the line drawn? Who defines what a terminal illness is?
It is easy to see how this slippery slope could threaten the FDA’s
very legitimacy and existence in general.151 This is a substantial price
to pay where preliminary determinations of safety and efficacy for
many products “often prove unfounded, and drugs that initially ap-
pear promising are frequently found ineffective or even affirmatively
dangerous to life and health.”152 In this context, it is important to
remember that a majority of drugs do not complete the clinical trials.
For cancer treatment, approximately five percent of drugs are ulti-
mately approved by the FDA and reach the market. “Thus, when inves-
tigational drugs are fully tested by the FDA’s clinical trial process, the
expectations regarding safety and efficacy that led the sponsor to initi-
ate the process commonly prove to be unfounded.”153
Even in light of the compelling and tragic cases that move the
audience to argue in favor of expanded access, regulation is nonethe-
less essential to the population at large. The FDA provides a public
utility that, if undermined, would lead every citizen of the United
States to question both the safety and efficacy of the products that
they consume. The court in Abigail Alliance III ultimately came to the
correct decision—a conclusion that possesses foresight and appropri-
ately takes into account the potential outcome of extending a funda-
mental right in this context. It is important to note that even absent
the recognition of a fundamental right, legislation could be passed to
grant early access. Such legislation would be appropriate in nature
148. Id. at 555–56.
149. Leonard, supra note 125, at 273.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 3.
153. Id. at 4 (“Successful clinical trials are the exception, not the rule.”).
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and scope because it would protect against the slippery-slope finding
that all individuals are entitled to receive life-sustaining drugs.
4. The Potential Liability of Physicians and Pharmaceuticals is a
Legitimate Concern
Litigation as a theme reoccurs in this Comment, specifically in
the context of the threat of an outpouring of lawsuits serving to chill
the actions of both physicians and pharmaceutical companies. It is
important to note instances in which clinical trials have been sus-
pended because of serious injury to a participant.154
In 1999, Jesse Gelsinger, an eighteen year-old boy afflicted with a
mild form of an inherited liver disease, sustained multiple-organ fail-
ure and died in response to a dose of a viral vector that was designed
to insert healthy genes into his liver cells.155 The fatal treatment was
considered to be risky for an individual who was coping relatively well
with such a disorder.156 The Gelsinger family sued the University of
Pennsylvania and the director of the bioethics program, among
others, alleging “that the information provided in the informed con-
sent documents was incomplete and that the research team deliber-
ately misled the family about the safety of the protocol by withholding
information about previous adverse events associated with the gene
therapy procedure.”157
Similarly, Ellen Roche, a twenty-four year-old healthy participant,
died while participating in a 2001 study that sought to understand the
physiological mechanism of asthma.158 Roche’s inhalation of the
chemical provided to her ultimately led to the failure of her lungs and
kidneys.
For purposes of this Comment these examples are limited—how-
ever, they demonstrate that the occurrences of side effects should not
be lightly overlooked as they can have significant and concrete conse-
quences for biomedical research. As such, society should favor the
propagation of research that can treat many as opposed to the pro-
longed life of one.
154. Noah, supra note 43, at 177.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 178.
158. Id. This led to the suspension of all federally-funded research at Johns Hopkins
University. Id. at 179.
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B. Deontological View
The deontological principals focus on individual morality; these
principals are not justified in terms of their consequences. Kantian
philosophy is grounded on the “moral status of persons in the capacity
for autonomous rational agency; roughly, the capacity to make one’s
own choices about what to do.”159 In contrast to the utilitarian ideals,
there exists a strong argument for individual choice and interests.160
The deontological perspective treats the concept of justice as fair-
ness, because “persons accept in advance a principle of equal liberty
and they do this without a knowledge of their more particular
ends.”161 Under the deontological framework, however, the “question
of attaining the greatest net balance of satisfaction never arises in jus-
tice as fairness; this maximum principle is not used at all.”162 There-
fore, deontology, from philosophers such as W.D. Ross, distinguishes
between what is good and what is right—arguing that “some people
fail to notice the distinction between ‘right’ and ‘morally good’, and
that others, while distinguishing the meaning of these terms, think
that only what is morally good is right.”163 A morally good act results
from decisions that have a good motive.164 Conduct that is right need
not be achieved through a good motive.165 In that sense, moral obliga-
tions exist even when an action does not effectuate the greater good.
This theory creates duties both for the respect of humanity and the
ability of self-determination.
1. The Patient’s Perspective: Consideration of the Individual
The arguments made by Abigail Alliance are deeply rooted in the
deontological perspective—that is, the right of an individual to re-
159. Maria Merritt, Bioethics, Philosophy, and Global Health, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 273, 286 (2007).
160. Consider this example:
One might think of a community attempting to bring its members to realize a
higher level of health and to lower certain health care costs by stopping smoking
and engaging in exercise programs. What of the sedentary smokers who do not
judge that such is worth the effort? The achievement of the communal view of the
good will often fall prey to the free choice of individuals not to aid its prospering.
ENGELHARDT, supra note 110, at 83.
161. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 31 (Belknap Press 1971).
162. Id. at 30.
163. DAVID ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 3 (Phillip Stratton-Lake ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2002) (1930).
164. Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 3.
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ceive medical treatment as a citizen of the United States.166 The cen-
tral contention is that terminally ill patients who have no approved
treatment options have a right to decide for themselves whether or
not they wish to take an investigational drug that the government con-
cedes is safe for human testing.167
This argument presents a challenge to the FDA restrictions on
the grounds that they violate principles of autonomy and privacy.168
In a society that has protected the right to privacy, the right to die, the
right to bodily integrity, and the right to bear children, the right to
live should be considered fundamental.169 Deontology would com-
mand dignity and respect for life choices without the consideration of
the implications of individual choices on the society at large. However,
in terms of public policy, recognition of the deontological persuasion
could have a disastrous effect on the health care industry:
If we truly value bodily autonomy and patient self-determination,
why limit the question to terminally ill patients? Why not recognize
any person’s interest in ingesting potentially palliative, curative, or
harmful drugs, free from government interference? On autonomy
grounds alone, there does not seem to be a basis for the
distinction.170
Imbedded in arguments regarding personal autonomy is the no-
tion that patients should be able to assume the risk of negative safety
and efficacy consequences associated with the use of investigational
drugs outside of clinical trials. The predicament is that terminally ill
patients who have a very low life expectancy—and have exhausted all
of their viable FDA approved treatment options—are willing to toler-
ate various associated high or unknown risks in an effort to survive.171
Abigail Alliance argues that these patients are competent and can pro-
duce rational and intentional actions in the absence of controlling
influences.172
In order for patients to make competent and informed decisions
concerning their health and treatment options, they must have an un-
166. See generally Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Develop-
mental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008) (No. 07-444). This argument is
fully explained in the litigation opinion briefs, opinions, and supporting materials.
167. Brief of Appellants at 43, Abigail Alliance III, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No.
04-5350), 2005 WL 1826286 at *43.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Leonard, supra note 125, at 272.
171. See Currie, supra note 2, at 309–10.
172. See Alice K. Marcee, Expanded Access to Phase II Clinical Trials in Oncology: A Step
Toward Increasing Scientific Validity and Compassion, 63 FOOD & Drug L.J. 439, 450 (2008).
1174 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
derstanding of the potential risks and benefits associated with such
decisions.173 However, at this stage in clinical testing, there is an utter
lack of information surrounding the potential risks and benefits asso-
ciated with this avenue of treatment; therefore, the ability of patients
to give truly informed consent is jeopardized.174 The motivation for
entering into clinical trials or receiving expanded access is the idea
that the patient will directly benefit from the investigational drug.175
This behavior is known as therapeutic misconception;176 it is generally
attributed to the patient’s desperate willingness to enter these risky
situations.177 This misconception does not resonate with the purpose
of early clinical trials, which concentrate on the collection of evidence
as to the toxicity of drugs, rather than focusing on positive responses
in patients.178
In response to the compelling deontological arguments about
personal autonomy, I contend that it is important to examine the sta-
tus of terminally patients as “medically vulnerable.”179 Traditionally,
protection has been provided to individuals held to be in particularly
vulnerable positions, including: pregnant women, prisoners, the men-
tally disabled, and children.180 Such classification mandates additional
protection. Safeguards, such as institutional review boards, protect
173. Id. at 451.
174. Id. (“The five elements [of informed consent] must be met: voluntarism, capacity,
disclosure, understanding, and finally, a decision.”). This problem with informed consent
exists for individuals involved in the early stages of clinical research, where it differs with
respect to expanded access is that there is a lack of careful monitoring and a larger popula-
tion of individuals consenting to experimental treatment—therefore the problem is
magnified.
175. Id.
176. Therapeutic misconception is well documented and is exemplified by patients
that are unable to comprehend the distinction between clinical care and participation in
research. Iltis, supra note 132, at 420 (“Risks that may be imposed on research subjects may
not be imposed on patients, and harms for which patients may sue may not give subjects
the same valid legal claims. These differences may be startling to patients who are enrolled
in clinical trials but continue to see themselves primarily as patients, e.g., they are enrolled
in a trial because they are receiving or may be receiving medical treatment from their
doctor in the trial, and they see research participation as part of being a patient.”).
177. Marcee, supra note 172, at 451.
178. Id.; see also Iltis, supra note 132, at 419 (discussing a research study whose primary
purpose of is not to “benefit[ ] the subjects but rather to help answer a research question:
it is doing those very things that causes the study to be a research study.”).
179. Jerry Menikoff, The Vulnerability of the Very Sick, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 51, 51 (2009)
(noting that the “medically vulnerable” extend to individuals with serious illnesses that will
likely cause death, where the existing treatment options are unsatisfactory and the patient
is informed about a clinical trial that purports to have promising new treatment for that
illness).
180. Id.
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these populations from coercion and undue influence. In this in-
stance, the patient’s particular vulnerability results from the despera-
tion to find treatment for their life-threatening illness.181
Abigail Alliance’s patient population is composed of individuals
who are not able to participate in clinical trials because they do not
meet the requirements182—this fact furthers the argument that they
are incredibly vulnerable to potential adverse effects of the drugs.183
While there is a strong deontological argument for expanded access,
the gravity of the potential harm favors a utilitarian approach. This
approach has the potential to protect not only society at large, but the
terminally ill population as a whole.
2. Locke’s Theory of Property
Under the “Lockean” approach, “the original author, having ex-
erted mental labor to create work, is entitled to exclusive rights in
it.”184 Thus, the creator should be entitled to manage the use and sale
of his product as he pleases. Ultimately, this is one of the central argu-
ments of intellectual property law. Following this approach, it should
be the drug company and not the FDA that determines the sale of the
investigational drug. However, there is a distinction between owner-
ship to copyright and, for example, consummation of drugs that could
adversely affect the body. Drugs that can present dire consequences
should be regulated, notwithstanding the identity of their creator.
That being said, it is also in the best interest of pharmaceutical
companies to regulate the drugs that they produce and accordingly
strive to avoid negative publicity. Pharmaceutical companies may be
reluctant to provide these products internally, even in the presence of
FDA approval. Such dissemination could prevent the future retail and
distribution of the drug. Arguably, the physicians and the
pharmaceuticals are in the best position to make this decision about
the administration of a drug, even though it could still lead to limited
or no distribution.
The Supreme Court has no enforcement mechanism. Even if Abi-
gail Alliance had obtained a favorable verdict, without incentive,
181. Id. at 56.
182. For example, they are not of the requisite age.
183. Pharmaceutical companies first attempt to enroll patients seeking expanded ac-
cess; however, this is often not possible because of the heavy controls placed on the struc-
ture of the clinical trial to minimize the risk of the drug’s adverse effects.
184. Barbara Friedman, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of Copy-
right, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 161 (1994) (providing further background of
intellectual property and morality, particularly deontology).
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pharmaceuticals may have been reluctant to comply with the court
order and provide experimental drugs to terminally ill patients with-
out a minimum baseline of protection.185 As discussed supra, the phar-
maceutical companies would likely be unable to recover market value
for the distribution of the experimental drugs. In addition, pharma-
ceutical companies might fear tort litigation and the potential termi-
nation of the clinical trial due to harmful or deadly side effects. This
would limit their ability to manufacture various drugs.186
Even if the court had ruled in favor of Abigail Alliance, under a
theory of Lockean intellectual property rights, the pharmaceutical
would likely attempt to retain ownership and management of the drug
as it deems fit in light of considerations regarding costs, delay to the
market, and a heightened degree of risk to both the future of the
drug and the patient. In conclusion, the legal system based around
compassionate access must still preserve and develop an environment
that is favorable to innovation. Maintaining pharmaceuticals’ ability to
control distribution, quality, and quantity of their products will facili-
tate and encourage favorable development in both new science and
technology.
Conclusion
Every drug for cancer and other serious life-threatening illnesses
that the Abigail Alliance has pushed for earlier access to in our ten-
year history is now approved by the FDA! There is not one drug
that we pushed for earlier access to that did not make it through
the clinical trial process. Many lives could have been saved or ex-
tended, if there had been earlier access to these drugs!187
—Frank Burroughs, Founder
Currently, the proposed reform—namely the Compassionate Ac-
cess Act—seeks “to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
to create a new conditional approval system for drugs, biological prod-
ucts, and devices that is responsive to the needs of seriously ill pa-
tients, and for other purposes.”188 However, it has not been acted on
since 2010. As such, the debate over early access to drugs for terminal
patients persists:
185. Ashley Ochs, Comment, A Study in Futility: Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs Will Not Expand Access to Experimental Drugs for the Terminally Ill, 39
SETON HALL L. REV. 559, 581 (2009).
186. Id. at 581.
187. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://abigail-alliance.org/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
188. H.R. 4732, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).
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On the one hand, when existing treatments have been tried and
have proven ineffective, patients who are suffering from serious
disease have an understandable interest in trying potentially effec-
tive investigational drugs, particularly when the patient’s illness is
life-threatening. On the other hand, allowing patients to obtain
and use unproven drugs carries a host of risks and potential detri-
ments for the public health.189
Clinical trials offer a hope of future treatment or a cure to patients
suffering from illnesses that are currently untreatable. The research
conducted and data garnered from these trials have the ability to dras-
tically transform the current practice of medicine in the United States.
Yet, research is not meant to be a form of treatment; rather, it is in-
tended as a bridge to successful medical application.190
Research studies involving clinical testing are not aimed at bene-
fiting research participants in a manner that would hinder or detri-
ment the collection of data addressing an imperative research
question. In many instances, the research structure involves proce-
dures that in fact are not in the best interests of the subjects.191 For
example, it is a frequent occurrence to give one condition a placebo
drug, which will have no beneficial impact and could prevent the sub-
ject from seeking additional treatment. Where a subject’s interest is
not the focus of the research study, there should be heavy protections
surrounding the individual—even if such regulations come at a high
price to individuals seeking an exception to the same.
Expanding access to post–Phase I drugs circumvents the rationale
behind research studies at the expense of a possible detriment to soci-
ety. It goes against the grain of regulation that historically developed
to combat the issue of unsafe drugs reaching the market and causing
catastrophic effects. It permits a judge to create a standard of care in a
field where the physician and paramedical company are vastly more
knowledgeable. Accordingly, while the outcome of Abigail Alliance III
temporarily took compassionate access out of the hands of the judicial
branch, the issue remains ripe for legislative decision—and the legisla-
ture should and likely will favor utilitarian arguments against ex-
panded access.
And yet, despite the propriety of employing utilitarian principles
in this context, one cannot help but wonder: Is there a better way? It is
189. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 5.
190. Noah, supra note 43, at 176.
191. Iltis, supra note 132, at 419. This includes subjecting healthy individuals to re-
search trials or mandating that participants who have an illness obtain a placebo treatment.
Id. at 420.
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difficult to ignore the plight of terminal patients in dire need of a
cure and deny them potential treatment options. One cannot simply
overlook the possibility that, in some circumstances, turning to an ex-
perimental treatment as a last resort might save a particular patient’s
life. However, the utility of FDA regulation of experimental drugs
should not be taken lightly. As it stands, “it is unlawful to procure
experimental drugs not only because they have not been proven effec-
tive, but because they have not been proven safe.”192 Although restrict-
ing access to experimental drugs may produce tragic results in certain
individual cases, the FDA’s overarching goal of ensuring safety to the
public at large remains paramount and must not be compromised.
192. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 57, at 13 (emphasis added).
